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"Poverty, Inequality, and Development:, Alleviation or Exacerbation?"
Gary S. Fields
ABSTRACT

This paper shows that both in theory and in practice the choice
of a relative inequality or absolute poverty measure of income distri
bution may make an important qualitative difference in assessing whether
economic development is benefiting the poor.

If one is primarily con

cerned with the alleviation of absolute poverty, it does not seem de
sirable to use relative inequality indices.

To the contrary, it is

more appropropriate to use absolute poverty measures such as the number
of individuals or families with incomes below a constant real poverty
line or the average gap between the incomes of the poor and the poverty
line.

Depending on the type of measure used, the results can look very

different.
Inequality and poverty measures are found to disagree qualitatively
in Brazil and India, but not in Taiwan.
a combination of favorable outcomes:

The Taiwan result is due to

(i) The rapid growth of the economy

and (ii) The decline in relative inequality.

Taiwan's poor received a

larger fraction of a larger total, so their absolute incomes unambiguously
rose.

Brazil, in contrast, satisfied (i) but not (ii), i.e., relative

inequality increased in a rapidly-growing economy.

The growth of income

more than offset rising inequality, though, leading to higher absolute
incomes for the poor.

In India, however, neither (i) nor (ii) held,

which may perhaps explain the majority of studies which show rising
absolute poverty ~espite constant relative inequality.
One might speculate that these case studies represent a more general
relationship between the rate of growth, the nature of growth, and the
alleviation of poverty:

rapid growth seems to reduce poverty unless
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inequality is greatly exacerbated, but poverty is not likely to diminish
when growth is lacking, at least within the existing economic order in
a given country and in the absence of major (if not revolutionary)
structural change.
less fixed.

For most economies distributional rules are more or

From this, it follows that the economic position of the

poor will be enhanced only when there is more to divide.

The contrast

between Taiwan and India is all too apparent. Alas, non-growth and
non-alleviarton of poverty seem to go hand in hand unless a far-reaching
decision is made to change the rules for dividing assets, rewarding
producti\re' factors, and distributing society's goods and services.

One

dimension ~f that choice is the evenness or unevenness of the growth
strategy p~rsued.

In this respect, the three countries discussed above

differ importantly.
Taiwaa is reputed to have followed an unusually broadly-based growth
path, improving the lot of large segments of the rural poor, encouraging
small-scale industry, etc.
lot

India's non-growth was even too, the economic

of the poor rising and falling with the weather and other external

conditions.

In contrast, Brazilian growth seens to have affected rela

tively few:

employment in the modern sector and other relatively favor

able occupations expanded, but only a small proportion of the labor force
was involved.

However, major sectors went nowhere:

rural workers' wages

and the urban minimum wage did not rise and whole regions remained under
developed.

Perhaps future research will determine if the evenness of

growth as well as the rate of growth are systematically related to the
rate of alleviation of poverty and, if such a pattern is found, why.
At issue is a very basic point:
development studies?

what is the ultimate aim of economic

I would suggest this question:

what combinations
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of circumstances and policies lead some countries to upgrade the economic
positions of their poor at faster rates than others?

The viewpoint

expressed in this paper is that studying the magnitudes and structure
of absolute incomes and poverty may be the best way of finding out
the answers.

Note: This paper was prepared for the Conference on Distribution, Poverty,
and Development, Universidad de Los Andes, Bogota, Colombia, June 1977.
The research for the paper was conducted at the Economic Growth Center,
Yale University, and Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Economico,
Universidad de Los Andes. Partial support for this research was re
ceived from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
under RP0/284 and from the United States Agency for International
Development under Order No. AID/otr-147-77 -4. However, the views
expressed do not necessarily reflect those of IBRD or USAID. I wish
to thank the above institutions without implicating them. The helpful
research assistance of Farrukh Iqbal and Judith Oder is gratefully
acknowledged.

"Among our century's most urgent problems is the wholly unacceptable
poverty that blights the lives of some 2,000 million people in the more
than 100 countries of the developing world. Of these 2,000 million, near
ly 800 million are caught up in what can only be termed absolute poverty--
a condition of life so limited as to prevent realization of the potential
of the genes with which they were born; a condition of life so degrading
as to be an insult to human dignity."

Robert S. McNamara, President, World Bank

A central concern among development economists is to gain an under
standing of the determinants of poverty and inequality so as to effect
their alleviation.

Poverty and inequality in less developed countries

(LDCs) have been studied in a number of different ways:

constructing

poverty profiles, estimating income-or earnings-generating functions,
calculating Gini coefficients or other measures of inequality, accounting
for inequality by decomposition analysis, figuring the inequality of incomes
received from different functional sources, and computing inequality among
various economic sectors or regions.

This paper deals with one of these

problems---that of measuring the extent of countries' progress toward the
alleviation of poverty in the course of their economic development.
The plan of the paper is as follows.

Section I presents alternative

ways of measuring improvement over time in income distribution.

Section

II gives empirical evidence for a number of less developed countries, illus
trating similarities and differences between the different measurement pro
cedures.

Section III summarizes the results and explores their implications

for future studies of economic development.
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I. Alternative Approaches to the Study of the Size Distribution of Income
A. Income as an Indicator of Economic Well-being
The maintained assumption of this paper (and of many other studies of
less developed countries) is that income is a suitable indicator of economic
well-being.

In many countries, household surveys and population censuses

yield information on the distribution of annual or monthly income.

While

current income is not an ideal measure of economic welfare, it is a close
proxy for many families.

Where available, supplementary data on wealth,

housing conditions, infant mortality and other economic indicators are use
ful adjuncts to information on the size distribution of income.
It is probably safe to assert that economic well-being is closely re
lated to the goods and services one consumes.

This consumption, in most

cases, depends monotonically and very nearly dollar-for-dollar on income.
Hence, the central role of income distribution as a measure of economic
position.

It is easy to think of exceptions to these generalizations:

the

cripple who derives less satisfaction from goods and services than the for
tunate among us who are well-endowed physically, the young couple receiving
large and frequent gifts from their parents, the rich with large asset
holdings who finance their consumption out of their wealth rather than from
their earnings, and the peasant family which grows and consumes its own
food and has little or no cash income deriving from the sale of a marketable
surplus.

In all these cases, cash income is an inaccurate measure of the

individual's or family's command over economic resources.

At issue is the

severity of the inaccuracies, since some are undoubtedly more worrisome
than others.
We should remember that the goal of many income distribution studies
in less developed countries, including the present paper, is to assess
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progress toward the alleviation of poverty and, more generally, to learn
how the benefits of economic development are distributed.

In other words,

we want to assess changes in income distribution within a country over
time.

In time series comparisons, wh~tever biases and limitations there

are in our data at one time may reappear the next time.

If so, changes

in current income are likely to parallel the changes in the "ideal" distribution of income. 1

This is not to say that more refined and better

data are not of great importance, for indeed they are.

What I mean to

be arguing is that in the interim, in countries with comparable and reliable
,income distribution data from household censuses and surveys, I think we
would do better to look at the available information to measure
that country's progress rather than to look at nothing at all.

Let us now

explore the principal approaches to the study of income distribution.
B. Income Distribution and Income Inequality
Despite popular parlance and practice, "income distribution" is not
the same thing as "income equality (or inequality)."

In a well-known book

on the subject, Bronfenbrenner (1971, p. 27) writes:

"By personal distri-

bution

we mean division of income (or wealth) by size, or more precisely,

by size brackets of the income or wealth of economic units."
in the original.]

[Emphasis

Later on (p. 43), he carefully distinguishes between

the personal distribution of income and statistics such as the coefficient
of variation which "measure the degree of inequality of a personal income
1

Note that this argument is made for the specific purpose of intracountry time series comparisons. For other purposes, such as international
cross-section comparisons, the biases and limitations are more serious,
rendering such comparisons tenuous.
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distribution."

[Emphasis added] 1

To illustrate the distinction between "income distribution" and "income
inequality", consider the simple case of two countries, one of which has
twice as much income as the other and that extra income is distributed
proportionately over the population.

For example, in two ten-person

economies:
YA= (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10)
YB= (2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20).
Are the income distributions in A and B the same or different?
answer the question ambiguously.

Economists

On the one hand, the entire income distri

bution is in a different position---everyone in B has twice as much income
as in A, and the total is twice as high too.
distribution is different.

So in one sense the income

On the other hand, in each country, the poorest

person's income is 10% of the richest person's, the second poorest's 20%,
and so on.

So in another sense, the distribution of income is the same.

This example gets at the difference between the distribution of income and
relative inequalitz in the distribution of income.

In our example, I would

prefer to say that absolute income distribution changed and relative inequality
did not.

In the remainder of the paper, the terms "income distribution" and

"income equality (or inequality) "will be used accordingly.
It is insightful to contrast the way we usually think about income dis
tribution from the way we are accustomed to think about the distribution
of other economic or social magnitudes, for example, the distribution of
education.

1

For education, our concern is how many people have attained what level.

The distinction here is just like the difference in elementary economics
between the definition of a multiplier (namely, the change in national income
which results from a given exogenous change in a particular economic variable)
and one measure of the multiplier (the reciprocal of the marginal propensity
to save).
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If a larger fraction of the population achieves literacy,

let us say,

we are inclined to regard that country's education system as having done
"better".

In making such a judgment, we usually do not think to ask

whether more people had also completed university; nor do we compute a
statistical measure of inequality of educational attainments, such as the
variance or a Gini coefficient.

Rather, our strategy is to pinpoint a

target group whose upgrading we care most about and then to measure the
rate of absolute improvement among that target group.
In studies of income distribution, the approach is ordinarily quite
different.

Most studies ask:

"Did income distribution worsen?"

Typically,

that question is answered by examining either (i) how the income shares of
particular deciles (or other groupings) changed, (ii) how the Lorenz curve
shifted, or (iii) whether measures such as Gini coefficients, variance of
incomes or their logarithms, etc. exhibit greater or lesser inequality.
All these are relative inequality measures. In effect, then, by beginning
with relative inequality measures rather than with absolute levels, the
approach to studies of the distribution of income reverses the approach
to studies of the distribution of other economic and social goods.
Let us now examine their various approaches to the study of income
distribution in some detail.
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C. Relative Inequality Approach
In most studies of income distributio n in less developed countries,
the income distribution measure under consideratio n is relative income in-

equality.

Relative inequality is convenientl y illustrated by a Lorenz

curve as shown in Figure 1.

The Lorenz curve depicts the income share

of any cumulative percentage of the population, ordered from lowest income
to highest.

All relative inequality measures in current use are based on

the Lorenz curve.

The Gini coefficient , being most directly related, is

the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45° line (area A in
Figure 1) to the total area (A+B).

The Gini coefficient thus varies between

zero and one, and the higher the coefficient , the greater the degree of
relative inequality.

The fractile measures

in common use, such as the income share of the poorest 40% or richest 10%,
can also be read directly from the Lorenz curve.

Finally, there is a class

of relative inequality Measures whicl1 may be calculated from the data con
tained in Lorenz curves.

These include many familiar indices such as the

variance (or standard deviation) of income or its logarithm, the coefficient
of variation, Kuznets ratio, Atkin~on index, Theil index, and many others. 1
In using one or more of these inequality measures, the judgment is
typically made that social welfare (W) depends positively on the level
of national income (Y) and negatively on the inequality in the
distributio n of that income (I).

For example, taking the share of income

of the poorest 40% of the population (S) as an index of equality and the
Cini coefficient (G) as an index of inequality, these studjes would hold that
1

Many references are avai1..-1ble which give definitions and description s
of these measures. See, for instance, Sen (1973).

r'

-7FIGURE 1
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1
Wi s pos itiv ely rela ted to Yan d san d neg ativ ely rela ted to G.

The term inol ogy of thes e stud ies is
ind ica tive ---f alli ng So r risi ng G
are give n the non -ne utra l term "wo
rsen ing of the inco me dis trib utio n," nd
a
it is gen eral ly thou ght to be a bad
thin g when risi ng mea sure d ine qua lity
is enc oun tere d.
Let us con side r a sim ple hyp oth etic
al num eric al exam ple show ing how
thes e judg men ts are brou ght to bea
r in p~a ctic e:
Example One.
Cou ntry

Rat e of Gro wth

Both cou ntri es
ini tial ly

Sha re of Low est 40%:
Lev el
% Cha nge

Cin i Coe ffic ient :
Lev el % Change

.363

.082

Cou ntry A
late r

11%

.333

-

8%

.133

+62%

Cou ntry B
late r

22%

.307

-15%

.162

+97%

Cou ntry B grew twic e as fas t as cou
ntry A.

How ever , rela tive inco me ineq ual ity

as mea sure d by the Cin i coe ffic ien
t and inco me sha re of the low est 40%
, seem s to be
"wo rse" in cou ntry B than in cou ntry
A; tha t is, it wou ld app ear tha t
the

rich ben efit ed at the exp ense of the
poo r, whose rela tive inco me sha re
det erio rate d. A dev elop men t econ omi
st mig ht que stio n whe ther the high
er
rate of grow th in cou ntry B was "wo
rth it" in term s of inco me di:: :;tri buti
on,
and a wel l-me anin g dev elop men t plan
ner seek ing to give very high wei ght
to
alle via tion of ine qua lity mig ht go
so far as to cho ose cou ntry A's pol
icie s
ove r cou ntry B's.

.,

1 1n

mat hem atic al not atio n:

w

Cl

f(Y ,S),
or

W• g(Y,G),

-9D. Absolute Poverty Approach

Now, let us consider another approach which looks directly at a
country's progress in alleviating poverty among the very poorest. 1
must first define what we mean by "poverty."

We

Suppose we can agree that

an individual is poor if his or her income falls below a specified dollar
amount, with analogous figures for families of different sizes. The
United States Agency for International Development, for example, makes
use of the figure of U.S. $150 per capita in less developed countries; 2
the World B~nk uses $50 or $75. 3

In other countries, the poverty line

is set with respect to minimal nutritional adequacy. 4

Let us arbitrarily

choose one of these figures as a poverty line and agree to hold it constant
·i n rea 1 terms.

Denote t he povert y line by P* .

"The poor" are those whose

incomes are less than P*.
Most observers would share the following judgments about the extent of
poverty (P):
(i) P is negatively related to the number of income recipients with
incomes below the poverty line

P*.

(ii) The larger is the average income of those below the poverty line,
the lower is P.
(iii) Other things unchanged, the more unequal the distribution of income among
the poor, the more severe is P.

1
Absolute income studies of less developed countries are the exception
rather than the rule. Economists at the Institute of Development Studies,
University of Sussex, have been taking an absolute income approach for some
time; see International Labour Office (1970). More recently, tl1e World Bank
has begun to shift its focus as well; see Ahluwalia (1974). These studies
are noteworthy precisely because they do differ from the usual approach.
2

3

4

See A.I.D. (1975).
See Ahluwalia (1974).

For example, Ojha (1970) and Webb (1976).
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In most studies, measures eatering into these three judgments are computed
)

separately.

However, in a paper just published, Sen (1976) combines these

measures and argues elegantly for the use of a composite index. 1
Absolute poverty measures like those just presented have been used in
research in the United States for many years; see, for example, Bowman (1973)
or Perlman (1976).

The main advantage of absolute poverty indices is that

they provide direct measures of changes in the number of poor and the extent
of poverty among them.

Note, in contrast, that although poverty indicators

can be computed from Lorenz curves or Lorenz curve-based inequality measures,
this information is obtained only indirectly and often with considerable
computational difficulty.
To see how the absolute poverty approach is applied, consider now
another numerical example for a given country in an early and a later stage
of its economic development.

Assume the following hypothetical figures,

where the poverty line is somewhere between $1 and $2:

1

The index recommended by Sen is
n =

H[i + (1-l)G ],
p

where H = head count of the poor (i.e., how many there are),
I = average income short fall of the poor (i.e. , the gap between p,';
and the average income of those below P~'t), and
Gp= Cini coefficient of income inequality arno~g the poor.
Thus, alternative specifications of the absolute poverty approach are1

o,

(a)

W = f (H) , f' <

(b)

w=

(c)

w = h(n), where n = 11[1 +

g (I)

g' < 0,
(1-l)G ], h' <
p

o.
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Example Two.
Percentage of Labor Force in:
High Wage Jobs
(Real Wage= 2)

Country

Low Wage Jobs
(Real Wage= 1)

Rate of Growth of Modern
Sector ("Modern Sector
Labor Absorption Rate")

Both countries
initially
Country Clater

20%

80%

100%

Country D later

30%

70%

200%

In both countries, the poor received the benefits of growth; but in country
D, twice as many poor benefited. 0ther things equal, development economists
would almost certainly rate country Das superior, and development planners
would seek to find out what had brought about that country's favorable
experience and adopt those policies in their own countries.

In this second

example, the preference is clear-cut, while in the previous example, the
issue was open to doubt.
E.

Relative Poverty Approach

The relative inequality and absolute poverty approaches are the two
main ways in which distributional aspects of economic development have been
considered.

In addition, there is now a newer approach being promulgated

by researchers at the World Bank and elsewhere known as the relative poverty

measure.

1 This figure is the absolute income (in constant dollars) received

by the poorest 40% of the population.

.

..

2

Consider now a third example:
Example Three •

~ountry _

Absolute Income of Poorest 40% of Population

Both countries
initially

$40

Country Elater

$40

Country Flater

$40

1 Sec, for example, Chiswick (1976).
2rhe choice of poorest 40% is purely arbitrary. What matters in this approa,
is the constancy of population share along with income variability among them.
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Using the relative poverty measure, it appears that there was no improvement
in absolute income of the poorest 40% in either case.

One might ask:

grow if the poor do not share in the benefits of growth?

why

In this third

example, E and F both seem to have failed to alleviate poverty.
F. Comparison of the Three Approaches
In point of fact, countries A, C, and E are the same country, and
countries B, D, and F the same country!

Real-world economic development

histories and policy projections are often presented in these different
Yet, as these examples make clear, how income distributio n is studied--~

ways.

whether in terms of relative income inequality (as in example one), absolute
incomes and poverty (example two), or relative poverty (example three)--may dramaticall y influence our perceptions of the outcome.
Specificall y, in our examples, we have encountered the following differences .
According to the absolute poverty criterion, B-D-F clearly dominates A-C-E
on both growth

and distributio n grounds. Using the relative

inequality criterion, it is difficult to judge; although B-D-F grew faster
1 Finally by the
than A-C-E, inequality seems to have worsened.
relative poverty criterion, both appear equally unsatisfact ory, since neither
country seems to have made progress in alleviating poverty; in fact, poverty
was being alleviated in both, and at different rates.
To my mind, the failure of the relative poverty meas\ire to record an
income distributio n change is worse than troublesome .

These. countries were

alleviating poverty, yet the relative poverty measure is totally insensitive
1

Whether inequality really worsened, even in relative terms, is
not entirely obvious, when one loolrn at the absolute figures presented in
Example 'fwo. The possi.bility that the usual relative inequality measures
may not be satisfactor y even for making relative inequality judgments in tl1is
type of growth is dealt with further in Fields (1976 ).
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to this.

On this basis, I would conclude that relative poverty measures

are unsuited for gauging the distributional consequences of this type of
growth.

Hence, I will ignore the relative poverty measure subsequently.

Note that the difficulties with the relative poverty measure arise
in cross sectional data, where we look at those who are the poorest 40%
ex post at different times

(i.e., disregarding the movement of specific

individuals into and out of the poorest 40%).

If we had longitudinal data,

and were able to trace the progress of those individuals who
were the poorest 40% ex ante, the problem
would not arise.

This is because their average income would be higher

the faster the rate of modern sector enlargement gro~th.

Unfortunately

in the real world, we do not have longitudinal data, so the relative
poverty approach has serious problems.
G. Exploring the Choice Between the Relative Inequality and Absolute
Poverty Approaches
Concerning the relative inequality and absolute poverty approaches, the
discrepancy between the two is based in part on a legitimate difference in
value judgments, in part on a statistical pattern which in some respects
is artifactual.

Let us explore these discrepancies further and ask:

(1) What is it about the process of economic development that produces
a discrepancy between the different approaches?
(2) In assessing the distributional consequences of growth, do we wish
to give greater weight in our judgments to the allevation of absolute poverty
or to the narrowing of relative income inequality?
The answer to the first question is that the discrepancy is produced by
the unevenness of economic development itself.

The pattern depicted exempli

fies what I call "modern sector enlargement growth," which takes place when
an economy grows by enlarging the size of its modern sector, the incomes (or
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wages) within the modern and traditional sectors remaining the same.

discrepancy arises because this type of growth affects only some of the
poor, not all.

Consequently, those whose situations are not improved by

this type of growth, and who therefore remain as poor as before, receive
the same dollar amount, but it is a smaller part of a larger whole.
this, it follows that:

From

(1) the absolute incomes of the poorest 40% are

1
unchanged, and (2) the Lorenz curve shifts downward at its lower end,
and consequently those Lorenz-curve based measures of relative income in
equality which are sensitive to the lower end of the income distribution
register a "worsening" of the income distribution.
We should note that "modern sector enlargement growth" is not just
the figment of some ivory tower academician's imagination.

This pattern

is widely-regarded as an essential ingredient of development.
famous book, Fei and Ranis (1964) wrote:

In their

" ••• the heart of the development

problem may be said to lie in the gradual shifting of the center of gravity
of the economy from the agricultural to the industrial sector ••• gauged in
terms of the reallocation of the population between the two sectors in
order to promote a gradual expansion of industrial employment and output."
This characterization is echoed by Kuznets (1966).

Empirical studies, such

as that of Turnham (1971), have documented the absorption

of an increasing

share of the population into the modern sector as growth takes place.
In a case study of Indian economic development in the 19SO's, Swamy (1967)
found that 85% of the change in the size distribution of income was due to
inter-sectoral factors (namely, growth in importance of the urban sector and
growing per capita income differential between the urban and rural sectors)
and only 15% to changing inequality within the two sectors.
1

Thus,

observe that some persons who were originally in the poorest 40% are now
in the high income sector and different individuals now comprise the poorest
detect that movement in cross-sectional data (in which
40%, but we cannot
the sampling procedures are the same but different individuals are sampled).
Longitudinal studies tracing the same individuals over time are needed, but
this kind of data simply does not exist for a representative sample of the
population in any less developed country.

-15modern sector enlargement comprises a large and perhaps even predominant
)

component of the growth of currently-developing countries.
The other question posed above regards the choice between absolute
and relative income measures in determining who does and does not receive
the benefits of growth.

The choice depends on basic ethical considerations,

so let me be forthright about my own value judgments.

For me, the plight

of the poor in less developed countries is objective, to the extent that
they do not have command over sufficient resources to feed and clothe them
selves and avoid disease.

Thus, to my mind, poverty is an absolute condition,

requiring analysis in absolute terms! I would therefore give predominant
emphasis to data on changes in the number poor, the average extent of their
poverty, and the degree of inequality among them.
Others have different concerns and make different judgments than I.
They would give great weight to the subjective feelings of the poor who may
feel relatively worse off if others' economic positions are improving and
theirs are not.

Observers who feel strongly about such relative income

considerations are justified in using relative inequality measures.
What may not be justified, and there are many examples of this in
the development literature, is the coupling of a concern over the absolute
economic misery of the poor

with reliance on calculations of changes in

relative inequality over time.

I fear this approach may be mistaken

misleading, quite apart from its logical inconsistency.

and

For just as in the

numerical example above, by assigning heavy weight to changes in the
usual indices of relative income inequality and interpreting these increases
as offsets to the economic well-being brought about by growth, important
tendencies toward the alleviation of absolute poverty may be overlooked.
1

In richer countries like the United States, relative income comparisons
may be more important, but my concern in the present paper is not with the U.S.
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H. Conclusion
This section ·has pointed out the types of issues involved in establishing
an income distribution criterion for assessing the progress of less developed
countries toward reducing poverty.

As I understand the intent of most de

velopment economists and planners, the primary goal of economic development,
and of aid to that development, is to alleviate absolute poverty, and only

secondarily to reduce relative inequality.

If the alleviation of absolute

poverty is the primary goal, and I agree that it should be, it seems logical
to measure progress toward that goal directly using absolute poverty criteria,
rather than indirectly by relativE: inequality or relative poverty indices.
The numerical exampl~jof this section have shown how differences among the
various approaches may arise.

If students of economic development or policy

makers use relative inequality meas.ures when they care most about absolute
poverty, they may be misled~
Unfortunately, this is not just ldle speculation.

Major differences

arise between the different approaches in the actual experiences of several
less developed countries.

Some case studies are presented below.
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II. Absolute Poverty Vs. Relative Inequality:

Three Case Studies

The bulk of the literature on income distribution in developing countries
is based on the assumption that figures on relative income inequality pro
vide suitable indicators of changes in economic position of the poor.
As Section I demonstrated, we may instead approach the question of changing
income distribution from an absolute poverty perspective.

From this point

of view, the relevant questions deal with the determinants of incomes in
general and of poverty in particular

and how the numbers in poverty and

the determinants of poverty have changed over time.

It should be obvious

that the relative inequality and absolute poverty approaches do not
necessarily agree with one another in assessing the distributional con
sequences of growth in a particular country.
an empirical question.

Three

Whether they do or not is

case studies are presented below.

A. Brazil

One of the most interesting and controversial cases of economic develop
ment is that of Brazil.
ec~nomic growth was 79%.

Over the decade of the 1960s, the real rate of
After allowing for a high population growth rate,

real income per capita grew at 32% over the decade, a substantial achieve
ment by LDC standards.

For the latter years of the 1960s and the first

part of the 1970s, Brazil experienced rates of growth approaching 10% per
annum.

On this basis, the Brazilian case was widely heralded as an

"economic miracle."
Then, a sudden cloud appeared on the horizon.

In an exceptionally

influential paper, Fishlow (1972) examined the distributional question of
who received the benefits of this growth.

Usinc the Cini coefficient of

inequality and the.income shore received by the richest 3% of the population,
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Fishlow observed a "worsening" of the relative income distributio n during
the 1960s despite the rapid economic growth of the latter years.

A

similar qualitative conclusion was reached subsequentl y by Adelman and
Morris (1973, p. 1) based on the income share of the poorest 40%.

Some

of the data underlying these conclusions are presented in Table 1.
The finding that income inequality in Brazil had become greater gave
pause to many.

As a result, there is now widespread disagreemen t about

the desirabilit y of.taking Brazilian economic and social policies as a
model for other developing countries to follow.

It is probably fair to

say that, because of Fishlow's paper, the Brazilian experience is no longer
regarded by most observers as "miraculous ."
It should also be noted that many economists in the field, although not
Fishlow himself, inferred from this evidence that tfie growth which had taken
place had been at the expense of the poor; see, for instance, Foxley (19 75).
A softer inference from the Brazilian data is that the poor did not share
in the benefits of Brazilian growth.

I submit that both inferences are in-

correct and arise from the use of relative inequality rather than absolute
poverty measures.

The conclusions which follow are drawn.from another

paper [Fields (1977)], to which the reader is referred for additional
details.
I should begin by pointing out that my research used Fishlow's own
data.

I did not challenge any of the underlying numbers.

To make absolute

poverty comparisons , we need data on changes in the number of persons with
incomes below a constant ~eal poverty line defined accordirig to Brazilian
standards and the average incomes among them. 1 For this purpose, Fishlow's
data do not quite suffice, since they are expressed in current rather than
constant cruzeiros.
1

Hence, exactly comparable figures cannot be calculated

Following Fishlow's precedent, I took the poverty line to be the
minimum wage in the poorest region of the country (the Northeast).
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TABLE 1

DATA ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN BRAZIL

Gini Coefficient of
Inequality, Total
Economically Active
Populationa

1960

1970

0.59

0.63

I

Income Share of
Richest 3.2%a

27%

33%

Income Shar~ of
b
Poorest 40% (estimated) ·

10%

8%

a) Source:

Fishlow (1972)

b) Source:

Adelman and Morris (1973).
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from published sources, so an appro:xmiation is needed.

I adopted a simple

linear scheme.
The derived data clearly demonstrate that the cumulative percentage
of population was lower in 1970 than in 1960 for every income bracket,
as may be seen in Figure 2.

This means that the economic growth which

took place in Brazil over the decade of the 1960's reached persons at all
income levels, and not just those at the top.
The finding that the absolute income distribution improved came as
a surprise to me.

To confirm its validity, I looked further.

my data are reported in Table 2.

Some of

These data reveal that the percentage

of the economically active population with incomes below the Brazilian
poverty level declined during the decade, those who remained poor were
less poor than before in real absolute terms, and the rate of growth of
income among the poor was at least as great as the rate of growth among
the non-poor.

More precisely, my conclusions concerning the changes in

income distribution in Brazil in the 1960s were:
(1) The entire income distribution shifted in real terms, benefiting
every income class.
(2) There was a small decline in the fraction of the economically active
population classified as below the poverty line, but those who remained
"poor" experienced a marked percentage increase in real income.
(3) The percentage increase for those below the poverty line was
greater than the increase for those not in poverty, and may well have been
twice as high or more.
(4) The relative income gap between "poor" and "non-poor" persons
narrowed in terms of ratios although the absolute gap widened.

FIGll~E

2.
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TABLE 2
SOME DATA ON ABSOLUTE INCOMES AND POVERTY IN BRAZIL,
1960 AND 1970

1960
Percentage of economically active
population with incomes below the
poverty line

37.0%

1970
Rate of growth
estimated 1960-1970
35.5%

Mean real income of the poor (NCr$ 1 000)

0.8

1.3

+63%

Mean real income of the non-poor

8.3

10.6

+28%

Mean real income of the economically
active population

5.5

7.3

+32%

Income difference, non-poor minus poor

7.5

Y.3

10.4

8.2

lncome ratio, non-poor relative to poor
Proportion reduction in poverty gap

Source:

Fields (1977).

41%
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(5) The bulk of the income growth over the decade accrued to persons
above the poverty line.

A similar pattern is observed for the United States,

an allegedly more egalitarian society.
(6) The poverty gap in Brazil was cut nearly in half between 1960 and
1970. 1

The United States reduced its poverty gap by the same percentage

over the same decade.
In summary, my reexamination of the income distribution data from Brazil
showed that the poor in Brazil did benefit from the economic
growth that took place during the 1960s. 2

In light of the rising Gini

coefficients and income shares of the very rich, the finding that the same
data are consistent with non-trivial improvements in the economic position
of the poor is a startling one.

However one regards the Brazilian model of

development, emiseration of the poor was not one of its features.

In

this case, exclusive reliance on relative inequality comparisons led many
to overlook important tendencies toward the allevation of absolute poverty.
We shall consider the implications of the Brazilian findings further
after reviewing changes in relative income and absolute poverty patterns in
India and Taiwan, where the situations were quite different.

1

The poverty gap is the total cumulative income shortfall of the poor,
i.e., the sum of the differences between each poor person's income and the
poverty line.
2

In stating this conclusion, I in no way wish to condone either the
persistence of the severe poverty that remains, or the apparent lack of a
strong commitment by the Brazilian authorities to alleviate the current
plight of the poor in this generation, or some of the more authoritarian
measures reputed to have been used to assure social stability.
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B. India
India is, of course, a very poor country which is growing very slowly. 1
India offers abundant data on the distribution of income and consumption dating
back to the 1950's.

Given the richness of the data in so poor a country

with so large a research 'establishment, it is not surprising that we find
a multitude of income distribution studies.

Some of the findings from

some of the more important of these are reported in Table·3._
The data in Table

3 differ with respect to the concept of income or

consumption employed, the procedures-by which the figures were derived,
and the years for which the distributions were estimated.

The remarkable

feature about the relative inequality data is that no clear pattern of change
emerges.

More specifically:

(1) Overall, as measured by the Gini coefficient, relative income
inequality shows no particular trend. 2
(2) The Gini coefficient within the urban sector may have risen somewhat,

suggesting greater inequality, but the evidence is mixed.
(3) The Gini coefficient within the rural sector seems to have de

clined, suggesting lesser inequality, but as with the urban Gini coefficient,
no strong tendency is found.
(4}Possibly,. th~ income share of the bottom 20% rose and the share of
the top 20% fell nationwide, together suggesting diminished inequality,
but both changes are small.

1

Per capita income is under $100. During the 1960's, per capita private
consumer expenditure grew by less than 1/2 % per annum; see Dandekar and
Rath (1971, p. 40).
2

Since Lorenz curves crossed, other relative inequality measures would
probably have yielded similarly inconclusive results.
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TABLE 3.

ESTIMATES OF RELATIVE INCOME INEQUALITY IN INDIA,
VARIOUS YEARS AND STUDIES

A. Study by Bhatty (1974) --

Data from NCAER
Year

Income Distribution Measure

1961-62

1964-65

1967-68

1968-69

0.41

0.35

0.46

0.43

..:

Gini Coefficient of Household
Income Distribution, Rural India

B. Study by Ojha-Bhatt (1974)

Data from NSS and National Accounts
Year

Income Distribution Measure

1953-55

1963-65

7%

7%

50%

48%

National

0.371

0.375

Urban

0.392

0.448

Rural

0.341

0.319

Share in Personal Disposable Income
Bottom 20%
Top 20%
Gini Coefficient

C. Study by Ranadive (1973) --

Data from NSS and National Accounts
Year

Iocame Distribution Measure
~

1953-54

1961-62

Bottom 20% - Estimate A

7.50%

7.80%

Bottom 20% - Estimate B

7.20%

7.60%

Share of Total Personal
Disposable Income

Top 207. -

Estimate A

44.34%

45.47%

Top 20% -

Estimate B

45.89%

46.70%

Rural

0.340

0.317

Urban

0.453

0.487

Gini Coefficient
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D. Study by Ahmed and Bhattacharya

(1972) -Data from NSS and National Accounts
Year

Income Distribution Measure

1956-57

1963-64

6.9%

7.6%
45.6%

Share of Pre-Tax Personal Income
Bottom 20%

49.4%

Top 20%

E. Study by Bardhan (1974)

0.372

0.418

Cini Coefficient

Data from NSS
Year

Income Distribution Measure

1958-59

1960-61 1963-64

1967-68

1968-6S

Cini Coefficient of Common Exp.
Rural

0.340

0.321

0.297

0.293

0.310

Urban

0.348

0."350

o. 360

0.345

0.350

Source:

Bardhan (1974).

'I I
'---,

In summary, given the inconclus iveness of the individua l findings, the
contradic tory indicatio ns as to whether inequalit y increased or decreased ,
and the small magnitude s of the changes as compared with probable errors
in sampling and measurem ent, it appears warranted to conclude that the
pattern of relative inequalit y in India remained essential ly unchanged .
A leading Indian economis t, P.K. Bardhan, takes issue with relative
inequalit y measurem ents of income distribut ion.

He contends: "For a

desparate ly poor country like India, there are many who believe that no
measure of inequalit y which is in tenns of relative distribut ion and is
independe nt of some absolute poverty standard can be entirely Satisfact ory."

1

According ly, he has calculate d estimates of the percentag e of the populatio n
below a constant absolute poverty line: Rs. 15 per capita per month at
2
His
1960-61 prices in the rural sector, Rs. 18 in the urban sector.

1
2

Bardhan (1974 1 p. 119).

In Bardhan (1974, pp. 119-124), he describes how these poverty lines are
computed. The minimally -adequate diet for a moderate ly active adult as recom
mended by the Central Governmen t Employees Pay Connnissio n consists of 15 oz.
of cereals, 3 oz. of pulses, 4 oz. of milk, 1.5 oz. of sugar and RUr, 1.25 oz.
of edible oils, 1 oz. of groundnut and 6 oz. of vegetable s per day, totaling
2100 calories and 55 grams of protein. To figure the family income required
to achieve this diet, Bardhan works out the cost per adult, adjusts for
family make-up by the adult-equ ivalent ratio, expands to a requisite family
income figure using the ratio of food to non-food expenditu res, divides by
family size to obtain a per capita amount, anrl finally deflates by the
official Agricultu ral Labour Consumer Price Index for the appropria te year for
the rural poor and by the official Working Class Consumer Price Index for
the urban poor.
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results , shown in Part A of Table 4 are strikin g:

Bardhan estima tes that

absolu te poverty worsen ed greatly in lndia over the 1960's even though
relativ e inequa lity did not. 1 Note p~rticu larly the compar ison with
Bardha n's own relativ e inequa lity estima tes in part E of Table 3~ ~Severa l other studies have also eati11a ted absolu te povert r changes in
rural
India.

Bardha n's conclu sion that absolu te poverty increas ed

1-

India

during the 1960's was sustain ed in a paper by Ojha (1970) publuh ~d con
tempor aneous ly with Bardha n's origin al work (1970).

Definin g poverty

accord ing to consum ption of foodgr ains rather than in rupees , Ojha found
that the inciden ce of absolu te rural poverty increas ed consid erably between
1960-6 1 and 1967-68 (see Part B of Table 4).

Furthe r corrobo ratimg evidenc e

may be found in a study by Vaidya nath~n (1974), who estima ted that real
per capita consum ption decline d for each fractil e group in rural popula
tion
and the propor tion below a consta nt absolu te poverty line increas ~d.
(Part C).
Before accepti ng the conclu sion that absolu te ~overt y worsen ed in India
in the 1960's , we should also take note of contrad ictory evidenc e presen
ted
by anothe r eminen t Indian econom ist, B.S. Minhas .

In a 1970 study, Minhas

reporte d a decline in absolu te rural poverty (see Part D of Table 4).

The

discrep ancies in the finding s of the various studies are due to a number
of method ologica l differe nces:

the use of adjuste d versus unadju sted con

sumptio n data, applica tion of differe nt price deflato rs, and measure ment
of the poverty line at a differe nt amount .

It is beyond the scope of the
presen t paper to attemp t to resolve these differe nces. 2
1Bardhan
(1974, p. 131) notes: "The directi on of change in the estima tes
of poverty is the same if one takes the various alterna tive minimum standar
ds
for the poverty line sugges ted in the literat ure." (Empha sis in the
origin al.)
2Reader
s seriou sly interes ted in knowing whethe r absolu te poverty "really "
increas ed or decreas ed in India may pursue the debate in greate r detail
. In
additio n to the studies mention ed above, for further bibliog raphic referen
ces,
see Sriniva san and Bardhan (1974), Sarnia et. al (1975), and Sen (1976).
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATES OF ABSOLUTE POVERTY IN INDIA IN THE 1960's

A. Study by Bardhan (1974)

1964-65

1968-69

Rural, percentage below
Rs. 15 per capita per month*

38%

45%

54%

Urban, percentage below
Rs. 18 per capita per month*

32%

37%

41%

B. Study by Ojha (1970)

c.

1960-61

1960-61

196 7-68

Rural, percentage whose consumption of foodgrains was
below nutritional norms

52%

70%

Study by Vaidyanathan (1974)

1960-61

1964-65

196 7-68

Rs. 6.3

9.0

7.0

5-10%

8.4

10.6

8.7

10-20%

10.3

10.6

8.7

20-30%

12.5

12.4

10.6

30-40%

14.5

13.3

12.4

40-50%

16.4

15.1

14.3

50-60%

18.8

17.5

16,. 4

60-70%

21.4

22.2

19.1

70-80%

25.1

23.8

22.4

80-90%

31.8

30.2

27.7

90-95%

40.9

35.8

34.6

95-100%

72 .2

65.7

51.0

All groups

21.5

20.3

18.0

60%

60%

68o/.

Rural per capita expenditure
(monthly) by fractile group*

0-5%

Rural population, percentage with
per capita consumption below Rs.
20 per month, NSS data*

D. Study by Minhas (1970)
Rural, percentage below
Rs. 20 per annum

* In 1960-61 prices.

1960-61
46%

1964-65
39%

196 7-78
37%
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In summar y, whethe r absolu te poverty was allevia ted or exacerb ated
in Indian econom ic develop ment depends on which study you believe .

For

our purpos es, the most importa nt finding is that in India, as in Brazil,
relativ e inequa lity measur es are found to sugges t one set of conclus
ions
with respec t to changin g income distrib ution while absolu te poverty
comparison s sugges t anothe r.
is exactly reverse d:

Interes tingly, the nature of the discrep ancy

indicat ions of more absolu te poverty (or less, in

the case of Minhas ' study) despite appare ntly consta nt relativ e inequa
lity
in India, allevia tion of absolu te poverty despite rising relativ e
inequa lity
in Brazil.

These discrep ancies are disturb ing indeed .

C. Taiwan
Unlike the cases of Brazil and India, when one analyze s recent Taiwan
ese
experie nce from either a relativ e inequa lity or an absolu te income
per
spectiv e, the qualita tive conclu sion is the same:

the poor shared in that

countr y's econom ic develop ment, their incomes increas ing at an above-a
verage
rate.

Data on Taiwan ese income distrib ution are shown in Table 5.
Row (1) of the table indicat es that per househ old income nearly doubled

in real terms between 1964 and 1972.
well-kn own to develop ment econom ists.
aspects of that growth .

This extraor dinary achieve ment is
Less well-kn own are the distrib utiona l

These are reporte d in rows (2) - (5).

We see in

rows (2) and (3) that two measure s of inequa lity--- the Gini coeffic
ient and
the ratio of income s of the top decile to the bottom decile- --both
decline d,
the latter more than the former.

Other measur es of inequa lity also show

declini ng relativ e inequa lity over the period. 1

Rows (4) and (5) presen t

the absolu te real income s of various decile groups .
1

We see that the income

Fei-Ran is-Kuo note that most of the change took place after 1968,
which marked the end of the labor surplu s.
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN TAIWAN, 1964 and 1972.

(1) Mean income per household
at constant 1972 prices,
measured in thousands of NT$

1964

1972

32.5

61.0

Rate of Increase,
1964-72 (%)
+88%

(2) Gini coefficient

0.328

0.301

-9%

(3) Ratio of income share
of top 10% to bottom 10%

8.6

6.8

-21%

(4) Income share of poorest 20%

7. 7%

8.6%

+12%

(5) Mean income at 1972 constant
prices
(in thousands of NT$):
First decile

(lowest)

NT$ 9.9 ('000)

NT$ 20.6 ( '000)

+109%

Second

II

15.2

30.2

+98%

Third

II

18.9

36.1

+91%

Fourth

II

22.0

41.1

+87%

Fifth

II

25.3

46.2

+83%

Sixth

II

28.5

52 .1,

+83%

Seventh

11

32.9

59.6

+81%

Eight

fl

38.7

69.0

+78%

Ninth

fl

48.8

83.4

+71%

Tenth

II

84.5

128.8

+53%

Sources:

Kuo(1975, Tables 5 and 6) and
Fei-Ranis-K uo (forthcomin g, Diagram 1).
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share of the poorest decile increased, which in a rapidly-growing economy
implies even more rapidly-growing incomes among the very poorest.

A

comparison of the rates of growth of real incomes by decile grouping
(row (5)) shows a clear pattern:
the lowest end

highest rates of income growth at

of the income distribution.

Thus, the poor in Taiwan

did share substantially in that country's economic development, both
absolute poverty and relative inequality declining.
D. Conclusion
This section has examined changing patterns of income inequality
and poverty in three
differences.

countries.

The results exhibit some important

Data from Brazil suggest a "worsening" of the income distri

bution, insofar as the Gini coefficient was noticeably higher in 1970
as compared with 1960, the share of income received by the very richest
rose, and by one estimate the share received by the very poorest may have
fallen.

However, using an explicitly poverty-oriented approach focusing

on absolute rather than relative incomes, we find that the poor in Brazil
do seem to have shared in economic development, albeit to a limited extent.
Among other things, the percentage increase in income of those below a
Brazilian poverty line was at least as great and possibly double the per
centage increase of those above the line.
In India, the situation is quite different.
did not change noticeably.

Relative income inequality

Some observers have inferred from this that

although India did not grow very fast it had at least "held the line" on
income distribution.

When the figures are re-examined from an absolute

poverty perspective, we see that they did not hold the line at all.

Rather,

absolute poverty appears by most accounts to have increased considerably.
Only in Taiwan do the relative inequality and absolute poverty approaches

-33give similar qualitative assessments.

There absolute poverty was reduced

as the poor shared in economic development.
Let us now consider some implications of these conclusions.
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III. Conclusions
The main lesson from this paper is that in practice as well as in
theory the choice of a relative inequality or absolute poverty approach
may make an important qualitative difference in assessing whether economic
development is benefiting the poor.

If one is primarily concerned with

the alleviation of absolute poverty, it does not seem desirable to use
relative inequality indices.

To the contrary, it is more appropriate

to use absolute poverty measures such as the number of individuals or
families with incomes below a constant real poverty line or the average
gap between the incomes of the poor and the poverty line.

Depending

on the type of measure used, the results can look very different.
It is instructive to analyze why the inequality and poverty measures
agree qualitatively in Taiwan but not in Brazil and India.
result is due to a combination of favorable outcomes:

The Taiwan

(i) The rapid

growth of the economy and (ii) The decline in relative inequality.
Taiwan's poor received a larger fraction of a larger total, so their
absolute incomes unambiguously rose.

Brazil, in contrast, satisfied (i)

but not (ii), i.e., relative inequality increased in a rapidly-growing
economy.

The growth of income more than offset rising inequality, though,

leading to higher absolute incomes for the poor.

In India, however,

neither (i) nor(ii) held, which may perhaps explain the discrepancy be
tween some studies which show rising absolute poverty (Bardhan, Ojha,
Vaidyanathan) and those which report the opposite (Minhas).
One might speculate that these case studies represent a more general
relationship between the rate of growth, the nature of growth, and the
alleviation of poverty:

rapid growth seems to reduce poverty unless

inequality is greatly exacerbated, but poverty is not likely to diminish
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when growth is lacking .

This specul ation sounds suspici ously like the

"grow now, redistr ibute later" and "trickl e down" schools of though t
of the 1960's .

But that is not what I am saying.

Rather , I would

argue that within the existin g econom ic order in a given country ,
and in the absence of major (if not revolut ionary) structu ral change ,
,,,,,.,
any econom y's distrib utiona l rules are more or less fixed. From this,
it follows that the econom ic positio n of the poor will be enhance d
only when there is more to divide .
India is all too appare nt.

The contra st between Taiwan and

Alas, non-gro wth and non-al leviati on of

poverty seem to go hand in hand ••• unless a far-rea ching decisio n is
made to change the rules for dividin g assets , reward ing produc tive
factors , and distrib uting societ y's goods and service s.

One dimens ion

of that choice is the evenne ss or uneven ness of the growth strateg y
pursued .

In this respec t, the three countr ies discuss ed above differ
,

import antly.
Taiwan is reputed to have followe d an unusua lly broadly -based growth

path, improv ing the lot of large segmen ts of the rural poor, encour aging
small- scale indust ry, etc. 1

India's non-gro wth was even too, the econom ic

lot of the poor rising and falling with the weathe r and other extern al
condit ions.
few:

In contra st, Brazili an growth seems to have affecte d relativ ely

employm ent in the modern sector and other relativ ely favorab le

occupa tions expand ed, but only a small propor tion of the labor force
was
involve d. 2
1

2

Howeve r, major sectors went nowher e:

rural worker s' wages

See, for exampl e, Ranis (1974).

· See Fields (1977, Table 3) and Morley and William son (1975).
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and the urban minimum wage did not rise and whole regions remained underdeveloped.

1

Perhaps future research will determine if the evenness

of growth as well as the rate of growth are systematica lly related to
the rate of alleviation of poverty and, if such a pattern is found,
why.
At issue is a very basic point:
economic development studies?

what is the ultimate aim of

I would suggest this question:

combination s of circumstanc es and policies lead

•oae

what

countries to up

grade the economic positions of their poor at faster rates than others?
The Vi$Wpoint expressed in this pa~r is that studying the magnitudes
,,
and structure of absolute incomes and poverty may be the best way of
finding out the answers.

1

See Fishlow (1973a, 1973b).
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